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Illusory Losses
Cass R. Sunstein*

Recent empirical work demonstrates that people’s self-reported happiness is
surprisingly resilient to many large changes in life conditions; apparently significant
adverse events and conditions often inflict little or no hedonic damage. People with
disabilities—such as those on dialysis, with lost limbs, or with colostomies—appear to
show the same level of happiness or life-satisfaction as people without disabilities. The
reason for these results is people’s power of adaptation. Adaptation has several sources,
but it is often a product of attention: Most of the time, people go about their lives without
attending to, or focusing on, adverse conditions, and hence those conditions inflict little
hedonic harm. And if people make “hedonic judgment errors” about their own lives, they
are highly likely to make such errors when assessing hedonic losses experienced by other
people. These findings have important implications for the legal system, especially in the
context of awards for pain, suffering, and hedonic losses. A special problem is that if
people adapt to adverse changes because they cease to focus on them, the context of
litigation will produce a serious distortion, because the attention of juries and judges is
specifically focused on adverse changes. But there are two qualifications. First, some
injuries do inflict significant hedonic losses, because people cannot help focusing on
them; chronic pain, anxiety, and depression are the most obvious examples. Second,
people may suffer “capability loss” without suffering hedonic loss, and the legal system
should award compensation for “capability damages.”
These claims have broader implications for many questions of law and policy,
including appropriate priority-setting for governments concerned with the welfare of
their citizens. For example, increases in Gross Domestic Product are not much
correlated with increases in self-reported happiness, in a way that raises serious
questions about the focus on GDP; but GDP growth is closely correlated with social
gains, such as increased longevity, that are not captured by self-reported happiness. The
simplest conclusion is that pervasive existence of hedonic judgment errors raises the
possibility that both economic and regulatory policies are misdirected.
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“Nothing in life matters quite as much as you think it does while you are thinking about
it.”1
I. Six Claims
In this Essay I attempt to defend six principal claims:
1. In advance, people greatly exaggerate the hedonic effects of many adverse events,
largely because they do not anticipate their remarkable capacity to adapt to
changes. This capacity stems in part from a distinctive feature of human attention:
Those who suffer many losses do not focus, constantly or much, on those losses.
It follows that many losses are illusory or at least exaggerated, in the sense that
they inflict far less hedonic damage than people anticipate.
2. Both judges and juries are likely to make hedonic judgment errors, in a way that
produces inflated damage awards. The reason for these errors is that the legal
system asks people to focus on, and thus to attend to, losses to which plaintiffs
might well devote little attention in their ordinary lives. In short, the legal system
almost certainly produces focusing illusions in tort cases.
3. It is important for the legal system to distinguish between harms that impose
enduring losses, such as chronic pain and mental illness, and harms that do not,
such as losses of fingers and toes. The distinction between enduring and illusory
losses—for which ringing in the ears and loss of toes are illustrative cases—has
many implications for economic and regulatory policy.
4. Without acknowledging that it is doing so, the legal system appears to be
awarding “capability damages” under the name of hedonic damages. Juries award
damages for the loss of capabilities, even in contexts in which people are not
suffering a loss in the enjoyment of their lives.
5. It would be desirable to reform the legal system with the aid of a Civil Damages
Schedule, designed to accomplish three distinctive tasks: (a) translating hedonic
losses into monetary terms, (b) correcting hedonic judgment errors, and (c)
assessing capability damages where appropriate.

1
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6. An understanding of hedonic judgment errors raises the serious possibility that
many policies, both fiscal and regulatory, are ill-directed. Government might be
expending resources in the false hope that the expenditures will improve wellbeing. There are complex questions, however, about the relationships between
hedonic effects and the ingredients of good lives. A sensible society is not
concerned only about “happiness” or even subjective well-being, though both of
these certainly matter.
Now for the details.
II. Dollars and Welfare
The legal system must often assign monetary values to actual or apparent welfare
losses. When those losses are purely monetary, the assignment need not be difficult. If a
defendant has deprived a plaintiff of $10,000, the legal system will require the defendant
to pay $10,000 to the plaintiff. But the legal system has a great deal of difficulty in
turning some welfare losses into monetary equivalents.
A. Doctrine
Suppose that Jones has lost the use of two toes, or that Smith has become blind, or
that Wilson has been paralyzed from the waist down, or that Holmes has developed a
high degree of post-trauma anxiety, or that Johnson has been subject to racial harassment,
or that Benson has suffered a loss of cognitive capacity, or that Dickerson has become
impotent. The legal system allows people to recover for “pain and suffering.” The
adverse effects captured in the idea of pain and suffering are undoubtedly real, and the
legal system should attempt to deter them and to provide compensation. Indeed, hedonic
losses are often the most serious injuries that people face—far more serious than strictly
economic losses. But the resulting damage awards are notoriously variable,2 and it is not
clear that they are in any sense rational or coherent.3 An initial problem, which I will
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David Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. Rev. 256
(1989).
3
See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation or
Capricious Awards?, 8 Intl Review of Law and Economics 203 (1988); Randall Bovbjerg et al., Valuing
Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling Pain and Suffering, 83 Nw. L. Rev. 908 (1989); Gregory Rodgers,
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explore below, is that the extreme difficulty of translating pain and suffering into
monetary equivalents.
In many states, people are also permitted to recover “hedonic damages,” designed
to capture people’s loss of enjoyment of their lives. The line between pain and suffering
on the one hand and hedonic damages on the other can be obscure; events that impose
suffering also impose hedonic losses. The basic distinction is that hedonic damages cover
not affirmative distress or suffering but foregone gains, as when people are unable to
engage in valued activities, such as athletics.4 Hedonic damages might be sought, for
example, for the loss of a dog5; for the inability to engage in sexual relations6; for the
loss of a limb7; for the loss of use of an elbow8; for depression and self-consciousness as
a result of amputation of an arm9; for reduced cognitive capacity or mental retardation10;
or for becoming bedridden and thus requiring constant care.11 Here too, it is extremely
difficult to translate the relevant interest into monetary equivalents.
Even before the translation occurs, juries and judges investigating hedonic
damages and pain and suffering are asked, in a sense, to serve as “hedometers,” assessing
the adverse welfare effects associated with one or another loss. For purposes of analysis, I
shall henceforth refer to both pain and suffering and hedonic damages as “hedonic
losses,” while recognizing that the principles behind them are distinct. The idea of
“hedonic” losses is meant to capture the utility or (subjective) welfare losses produced by
some adverse event. I use the term “hedonic” to underline the connection with the

Estimating Jury Compensation for Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases Involving Nonfatal
Personal Injury, 6 J Forensic Economics 251 (1993).
4
See Day v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 823 So.2d 1039, 1044 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (high school
victim unable to play varsity sports for which he had been training since the sixth grade); Allen v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 241 F.3d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir. 2001) (award of hedonic damages for loss of ability to
ride horse upheld)
5
See, e.g., Campell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Haw 557, 632 P2d 1066 (Haw 1981) (allowing
emotional damages for negligent death of dog); Knowles Animal Hosp. v. Wills, 360 So.2d 37 (Fla Dist Ct
App 1978) (same).
6
See Varnell v. Louisiana Tech University, 709 So2d 890, 896 (La Ct App 1998).
7
See Pierce v. NYCR Com., 409 F2d 1392 (Mich 1969); Matos v. Clarendon Nat Ins Co., 808 So2d
841, 849 (La Ct App 2002).
8
See Kirk v. Wash. State Univ., 746 P.2d 285, 292 (Wash. 1987).
9
See Coleman v. Deno, 832 So. 2d 1016 (La Ct App 2002).
10
See Nemmers v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 567 (CD Ill 1988).
11
See Edward P. Berla et al., Hedonic Damages and Personal Injury: A Conceptual Approach, J
Forensic Economics (1990).
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emerging literature attempting to measure hedonic effects; the word “utility” would work
equally well.
Of course it is reasonable to ask about the theory on which the relevant judgments
of judges and juries are supposed to be based. As the law now stands, the working theory
is one of appropriate compensation or “making whole”—with the understanding that the
compensatory award is supposed to restore plaintiffs to the hedonic state, or the level of
welfare, that they would have occupied if the injury had not occurred.12 Under
appropriate assumptions, the award of compensation, properly calculated, will also create
the right deterrent signal, and hence accurate awards will promote social welfare as well.
If those who are harmed seek and receive compensation, compensatory and deterrent
goals should generally march hand-in-hand. As we shall see, however, the two goals
often diverge—as when a monetary award for serious pain, or chronic headaches, does
little or nothing to make the plaintiff “whole,” but does deter the kinds of acts that create
serious pain or chronic headaches.
B. Measurement
How can judges and juries possibly serve as hedometers, lacking as they do direct
access to people’s experience? On a standard economic approach, the legal system should
start with willingness to pay (WTP).13 As we shall see, WTP might well reflect a hedonic
forecasting error, in a way that complicates standard arguments for cost-benefit analysis
as well as legal awards. But even if a forecasting error is not involved, there is no obvious
way to ascertain the relevant amounts. Courts might ask: How much would people pay to
reduce a risk of some injury? Suppose that Jones faces a 1/200,000 risk of losing his dog,
of becoming impotent, or of being paralyzed from the waist down. How much would
Jones pay to eliminate that risk? A method of this kind is used in the context of mortality
risks, where the value of a statistical life (VSL) is ascertained by asking about monetary
valuation as measured by reference to WTP.14 Either revealed preference or contingent
valuation studies might be used for this purpose.
12

For discussion, see Edward McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives in Pain and
Suffering Awards, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1341 (1995).
13
See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Risk Policy (1998).
14
See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1994).
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But this approach is barred in tort cases,15 which ask not about valuation of risks,
but instead about injuries after they occur. Technically, of course, the answer to the two
questions might well turn out to be identical. If Jones would be willing to pay $10 to
eliminate a 1/200,000 chance of losing his dog, the loss of his dog would seem to be
worth $2 million. But this statement of equivalence raises many questions, at least if it is
meant to capture actual behavior. Various cognition distortions might ensure that people
would pay far less, or far more, than $10 to avoid a risk of 1/200,000, even if the ultimate
loss would be worth $2 million. In any case it is far from clear that most people would
produce a monetary figure, for a 1/200,000 risk of some injury, such as the loss of an
arm, equal to 1/200,000 the amount that they would produce for a certainty of the same
injury.
To assess hedonic damages, courts might be inclined to ask: How much would
people have to be paid to incur the relevant loss? The question might be how much
people would demand to give up three fingers, or two toes, or sexual capacities, or the
use of an arm. This question is often described as involving “willingness to accept,” or
WTA.16 But the legal system bans courts from asking the WTA question, whether it is
phrased in terms of WTA to face risks or WTA to face actual losses.17 There are two
possible reasons, involving loss aversion and humiliation respectively. Both of these may
mean that people’s WTA would be excessive if measured against the loss.
It is well-established that people are highly averse to losses, in the sense that they
will demand more to give up a good than they would be willing to pay to obtain that good
in the first instance.18 By itself, this point does not establish that WTA is the wrong
measure; perhaps people’s WTA more accurately captures the welfare loss than WTP.19
But evidence suggests that loss aversion may well reflect a hedonic forecasting error:
People greatly exaggerate the actual hedonic harms associated with a loss from the status
quo.20 If this is so, then the WTA question is the wrong one; people’s answers will not
15

See Viscusi, Pain and Suffering, supra note.
See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw L Rev 1227 (2003).
17
See Edward McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives in Pain and Suffering
Awards, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1341 (1995).
18
See Richard Thaler, Quasi-Rational Economics (1993).
19
For a good discussion, see Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, supra note.
20
See Deborah A Kermer et al., Loss Aversion Is an Affective Forecasting Error 17 Psychological
Science 649 (2006).
16
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map onto the actual harm once the loss comes to fruition. I shall emphasize this point
throughout, because it raises the possibility that in many domains, people’s judgments
about hedonic effects will be wrong.
In addition, it would seem to be humiliating for people to acknowledge that for a
certain amount, they would be willing to allow someone to take two of their toes.21
Because they seek to avoid the humiliation, their answer to the question might greatly
overstate the hedonic loss. Suppose that people were asked: How much would you have
to be paid to accept some physical injury? Their response, including the humiliation
involved in offering any answer at all, might be far higher than their hedonic loss. An
obvious problem is the signaling effect of any affirmative answer; those who say that
they are willing to trade their toes for money might be offering a damaging signal about
their concern for their own integrity, bodily and otherwise. Hence people’s unwillingness
to accept a monetary amount in return for some loss may not reflect the hedonic effect of
the loss; the number may be inflated because of the signaling effect of acceptance.
Perhaps the right question is instead: How much would people, having
experienced the loss, need to be paid to feel adequately compensated for that loss? This
question, one involving “making whole” as distinct from “selling price,” seems to capture
the judgments actually made relevant by the legal system.22 But the “making whole”
question raises its own puzzles. How much money would be necessary to make a person
as well off as he would be if he had not been injured at all? Suppose that someone has
lost a spouse or a child, or that he now faces chronic (and severe) headaches, or that his
face has been permanently disfigured. What amount of money would restore the plaintiff
to her pre-injury state? Or suppose that someone has lost two toes or been paralyzed from
the waist down. When asked how much would make them whole, it is possible that
people would sincerely say that they would have to be paid (say) $100,000 for the loss of
two toes, or $5,000,000 to be compensated for paralysis. But perhaps those very people
do not suffer such a large hedonic loss from the relevant conditions. Perhaps they are not
greatly suffering, or not suffering at all, but would nonetheless claim (sincerely) that very

21
22

See Korobkin, supra note.
See McCaffery et al., supra note.
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high amounts are necessary to compensate them.23 (I will explore this puzzle in some
detail below, because it raises serious doubts about the standard economic analysis in
many domains of law and policy.)
Both willingness to pay and willingness to accept measures therefore face serious
problems. Those problems might be overcome if the legal system had direct access to
people’s welfare. Armed with an actual hedometer, legal institutions might be able to
make accurate measurements of the harmful effects of various losses. Those involved in
law might be able to know, for example, whether the loss of two toes, or a pet, or serious
disfigurement imposes a great deal of hedonic loss or not.24 The results of an accurate
hedonic assessment would represent substantial progress; and a great deal of effort has
been devoted toward making such progress.25
III. Adverse Conditions and Hedonics
A. Resilience and Hedonic Judgment Errors
A major finding is that human beings are unexpectedly resilient. As a result, many
apparently significant injuries do not inflict substantial long-term hedonic harms.26
Perhaps above all, it is important to distinguish between those adverse conditions that
impose large and persistent losses and those adverse conditions that impose only
transitional, short-term, or modest losses, because of human resilience. For purposes of
law and policy, a key point here is that people are often unable, in advance, to anticipate
the hedonic effects of adverse events, and their inability on this count produces hedonic
forecasting errors.27 Recall that for the moment, my concern is genuinely hedonic losses;
as we shall see, it is possible that people will not suffer such losses, strictly speaking, but
will nonetheless suffer losses of an important kind.
23

See D.M. Smith et al., Misremembering Colostomies: Former Patients Give Lower Utility Ratings
Than Do Current Patients, Health Psychology (forthcoming).
24
See, e.g., Washington v. Aetna, 886 So 2d 572 (La. 2004).
25
See, e.g., Richard Layard, Happiness (2005); Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for
Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day Reconstruction Method, Science 1776 (2004); Peter Ubel
and George Loewenstein, Pain and Suffering: It’s Not (Just) About Pain and Suffering, J Legal Stud
(forthcoming 2007)..
26
Overviews can be found in Daniel Kahneman et al., Well-Being (2002); Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling
on Happiness (20060.
27
See, e.g., Daniel Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 75 J Pers Soc Psych 617 (1998).
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Let us begin with the limited hedonic effects of many positive changes. Lottery
winners are not happier, a year later, than other people are.28 Marriage is often thought to
be associated with increases in happiness, but after a few years, married people are not
happier than they were before.29 Apparently marriage produces a significant hedonic
“boost,” but the boost is short-lived, and people return fairly quickly to their pre-marriage
state. Increases in salary have a similar feature; a 20% increase is highly welcome, but
after a short period, people do not show a significant long-term change in self-reported
happiness or life satisfaction.
With respect to many negative changes, including those that concern the legal
system, the hedonic effects are often surprisingly small. It is remarkable but true that
paraplegics are only modestly less happy than other people.30 Young people who have
lost a limb as a result of cancer show no less happiness than similarly situated young
people who have not had cancer.31 Moderately disabled people recover to their predisability level after two years.32 Kidney dialysis patients do not show lower levels of
happiness than ordinary people.33 Colostomy patients report levels of happiness that are
about the same as people who have not had colostomies.34 (Intriguingly, those with
colostomies greatly exaggerate their actual level of happiness before they had
colostomies—while those with reversed colostomies report that before the reversal, they
were far less happy than they were in fact.35 I will return to these findings below.)
From this evidence, it is fair to conclude that healthy people systematically
overestimate the adverse effects of many physical problems. Those who face such

28

Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer at 410-11.
Compare Andrew E. Clark, Ed Diener, Yannis Georgellis, and Richard E. Lucas, Lags and Leads in
Life Satisfaction: A Test of the Baseline Hypothesis, CNRS and DELTA-Federation Jourdan Working
Paper No. 2003-14 (2003) and Richard Easterlin, Building a better theory of well-being, IZA Discussion
Paper No. 742 (2003).
30
Daniel Kahneman and Alan Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being,
20 J Econ Persp 3, 14 (2006). An interesting question, not explored in the hedonic literature, is the extent to
which discrimination and stigma might contribute to the (admittedly modest) decrease in happiness, or
perhaps in more significant decreases in moment-by-moment happiness.
31
Ubel and Loewenstein, supra note.
32
Andrew Oswald and Powdthavee Nattavudh, Does Happiness Adapt? A Longitudinal Study of
Disability with Implications for Economists and Judges, Mimeo, University of Warwick (2005).
33
See id.
34
See Smith et al., supra note.
35
See Ubel and Loewenstein, supra note.
29
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problems experience unexpectedly little in the way of hedonic loss.36 To be sure, it is
possible to question the relevant findings; social scientists do not yet have hedometers.
But from the existing work, the basic conclusions follow whether we rely on global
measures of happiness or life-satisfaction, which have been shown to have a high degree
of external validity,37 or moment-by-moment measures of mood and happiness, which
seem to be even more reliable.38
In a less dramatic vein, assistant professors greatly overstate the effect of an
adverse tenure decision on their subjective happiness.39 They expect that this decision
will affect their happiness for many years, and in part for that reason, greatly want to be
tenured. But after a few years have passed, those who were denied tenured show no less
happiness than those who were tenured. Many voters believe that the outcome of an
election will greatly affect their happiness a month after the election is held. But in that
month, supporters of losing and winning candidates are as happy as they were before the
election.40 People have been found to overestimate the welfare effects of personal insults,
the outcomes of sports events, and romantic breakups; in all of these circumstances, the
adverse effects, while real and for a time severe, are surprisingly small and short-term. 41
B. Enduring vs. illusory Losses (or Loud Unpleasant Noises vs. Fewer Toes)
To say this is not to deny that some advantageous events and conditions create
large and enduring gains, and that some adverse events and conditions impose serious
and persistent losses. Various drugs, such as Prozac, apparently create long-term boosts
in subjective well-being. It is easy to imagine changes in the allocation of time—from,
say, commuting and work to socializing, vacations, and leisure—that would produce

36

Id.
See Kahneman and Krueger, supra note.
38
See Ubel and Loewenstein, supra note. For a good discussion of the complex question whether the
relevant scales are reliable, see George Loewenstein and Peter Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of
Decision and Experience Utility (unpublished manuscript 2006). For present purposes I am assuming that
the scales are reliable, or reliable enough, in obtaining hedonic measures, while recognizing that the
existing evidence, while highly suggestive, is not conclusive on that point.
39
Daniel Gilbert and Timothy Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecasting of Future
Affective States, in Feeling and Thinking 186 (Joseph Forgas ed. 2000).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 353.
37

10

enduring benefits.42 Hence it is false to say that people’s resilience, and their capacity for
adaptation, ensure that social changes and interventions are powerless to affect happiness
or life-satisfaction. The task is to ensure that any changes counteract persistent rather
than illusory losses, or that they produce gains to which people will not quickly adapt.
On the negative side, consider the instructive and in a sense defining example of
loud, unpleasant noise, which people much dislike, and which they do not dislike less as
time passes.43 With respect to highway noise, people show approximately the same level
of irritation over a period of more than a year—and as time passes, they become more
pessimistic, not less so, about their ability to adjust to the noise.44 The physiological
effects of noise do not diminish in children over a significant period of time.45 A study of
college students finds greater levels of annoyance at dormitory noise at the end of the
year than at the beginning.46 Unpleasant noise reduces people’s enjoyment of their lives,
and it continues to reduce their enjoyment for significant periods of time. We should
conclude that tortuous behavior that causes (for example) loud ringing in the ears will
impose very serious and quite long-term hedonic losses.
Many adverse conditions belong in the same category as noise. Just as people
overestimate the hedonic harm of many physical losses, such as kidney dialysis and
colostomies, so too people underestimate the hedonic effect of adverse effects, such as
depression and chronic pain.47 Leading sources of low levels of happiness include mental
illness (such as anxiety and depression)48; subjectively reported bad health (above all,
pain imposes severe and continuing hedonic losses)49; unemployment50; and separation
from a spouse.51 The process of divorce is bad, but not as bad as separation; notably,

42

See Robert Frank, Luxury Fever (2000).
Shane Frederick and George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation 303, 311, in Well-Being (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds. 1998).
44
Neil D. Weinstein, Community Noise Problems: Evidence Against Adaptation, 2 Journal of
Environmental Psych. 87 (1982).
45
Frederick and Loewenstein, supra note.
46
Id.
47
See Peter Ubel et al., Whose Quality of Life? A Commentary Exploring Discrepancies Between
Health State Evaluations of Patients and the General Public, 12 Quality of Life Research 599 (2003).
48
Frederick and Loewenstein, supra note.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Layard at 64.
43
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people adjust fairly quickly and return to their pre-divorce state.52 More speculatively, we
might suggest that some medical conditions produce significant and enduring losses to
the extent that people do not stabilize but instead must anticipate medical results and
consider, with some frequency, whether they are getting better or worse. Certain cancers,
in which significant periods of time are spent expecting and receiving results, might well
fall in the same category as noise. Also speculatively, we might suggest that some
conditions impose significantly and enduring losses to the extent that they produce
discrimination and stigma of the kind to which people do not easily adapt and on which
they tend to focus. Serious facial disfigurement, for example, might produce enduring
hedonic losses because of the social consequences of having a disfigured face.
It is therefore important to distinguish among four phenomena: (1) gains that are
significant and enduring, such as those produced by relief of chronic pain; (2) gains that
are largely illusory, such as those produced by increases in salary; (3) losses that are
significant and enduring, such as those produced by depression and anxiety; and (4)
losses that turn out to be illusory (at least in the long term), such as those produced by
loss of limbs or by colostomies. For purposes of the legal questions on which I am
focusing here, the latter two phenomena are the most important.
C. Failures of Affective Forecasting
From these findings, we can draw two general conclusions. The first is that many
apparently serious losses inflict relatively little in the way of long-term hedonic harm.
The second is that people do not anticipate this fact; they expect far more harm than they
actually experience. A key reason is that people neglect the power of psychological
mechanisms that immunize them from the kinds of hedonic losses that they expect to face
in the event that things go wrong.
In many cases, people are subject to “immune neglect”; they do not see the power
of their internal psychological immune system, which greatly diminishes the welfare
effects of apparently significant changes. A related problem is that people demonstrate a

52

Andrew E. Clark, Ed Diener, Yannis Georgellis, and Richard E. Lucas, Lags and Leads in Life
Satisfaction: A Test of the Baseline Hypothesis, CNRS and DELTA-Federation Jourdan Working Paper No.
2003-14, 9 (2003).
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kind of “impact bias,”53 in the form of a tendency to exaggerate the effect of future events
on their own emotional states. The exaggerations are sometimes described as a
consequence of “duration bias,”54 understood as a tendency to overestimate of the length
of time during which undesirable effects will have an emotional impact. “The conclusion
from this body of research is that people are systematically wrong in their expectations
about the life circumstances that will increase or decrease their happiness, which in turn
implies that life choices that people make in their pursuit of happiness are also likely to
be wrong.”55
The implication for the legal system is clear. If ordinary people make mistakes in
forecasting the effects of adverse events in their own lives, there is every reason to think
that juries (and judges) will make similar mistakes in assessing the effects of those events
on plaintiffs, especially but not only when they are projecting future losses. Hedonic
judgment errors are likely to affect those involved in the legal system as well as ordinary
people in ordinary life. As we shall see, the same point applies to policymakers, including
regulators.
D. Adaptation, Attention, and Focusing Illusions
Why, exactly, do adverse events often have relatively little effect on people’s
subjective well-being? The general phenomenon is adaptation; an underlying
mechanism, which might be defined as a distinct phenomenon, involves attention. When
apparent losses inflict surprisingly little hedonic harm, it is often because people do not
much focus on those losses after a period of transition.56
A great deal of work explores the possibility of “adaptive preferences,” which
arise as people adapt their preferences to the existing circumstances.57 Consider the tale
of the fox and the sour grapes. Knowing that they are unavailable, the fox does not want

53

See Affective Forecasting, supra note, at 349.
Id. at 230.
55
Id. at 231.
56
See Daniel Kahneman et al., The Structure of Well-Being in Two Cities (unpublished manuscript
2007). But see Peter Ubel et al., Disability and Sunshine, 11 Journal of Exp Psych 111 (2005) (noting that
adaptation is a distinctive phenomenon, not necessarily produced by attention, and finding that it is easier
to get people to appreciate adaptation than to reduce focusing illusions).
57
See, eg, Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (1983).
54
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the grapes; his preference is a product of their unavailability, to which he has adapted.58
The point might be counted as a challenge to utilitarianism: If people do not want
opportunities or goods that are unavailable, is it so clear that the unavailability of those
opportunities or goods can be defended by reference to people’s wants? Whether or not
this question can be answered, it is clear that when people’s preferences have adapted to a
social situation, their hedonic state will be much better than outsiders will anticipate.
For an apparent real-world example, consider a study of self-reported health in
India, a year after the Great Bengal Famine of 1943.59 Only 2.5 percent of widows said
that they were “ill,” and none said that they were in “indifferent” health. By contrast, 45.6
of widowers said that they were either ill or in indifferent health. The irony was that the
widows were in significantly worse health than the widowers.60 Evidently the widows
adapted to their situation, and generally believed that their health was good.
Most generally, the term “hedonic adaptation” refers to the adjustment over time
in the intensity of people’s emotional reactions to adverse events, in a way that ensures
unexpectedly limited losses in terms of subjective happiness.61 The central factor here is
that people’s affective responses to a bad event or condition typically abate as time
passes.62 Those who have been denied tenure, or lost the use of a limb, or have had a
colonoscopy, will react intensely at first, but after a year, their affective response will be
much smaller. When moderately disabled people show little or no hedonic loss,
adaptation, thus understood, is the key reason.
A distinctive mechanism, which can also be taken as one explanation for the
general phenomenon of adaptation, involves the operation of human attention.63 When
people lose the use of an arm, they do not think, most of the time, about the fact that one
of their arms does not work. Instead they focus on the central features of their hours and
their days—their jobs, their meals, their relationships, the book they are reading or the
television show they are watching. To the extent that significant losses do not produce
hedonic damages, it is frequently because people’s attention is not directed, most of the
58

Id.
See Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development 139 (1999).
60
Id.
61
See Frederick and Loewenstein, supra note, at 303.
62
See Peter Ubel et al., Whose Quality of Life?, 12 Quality of Life Research 599 (2003).
63
See Daniel Kahneman and Robert Sugden, Experienced Utility As A Standard of Policy Evaluation,
32 Environmental and Research Economics 161 (2005).
59

14

time, to those losses. Daniel Kahneman describes the problem in a wonderful maxim, my
epigraph here: “Nothing in life matters quite as much as you think it does while you are
thinking about it.”64
A failure to focus on what has been lost helps to explain the absence of substantial
hedonic effects from apparently large losses. Focusing illusions help in turn to account
for people’s surprise at the absence of such effects. People are surprised because they
focus specifically on the loss, and thus conclude that it has large hedonic effects,
neglecting to see that those who have experienced the loss do not, most of the time, focus
on it. For hedonic forecasting, the general point is that when asked to focus on a
particular aspect of life or a particular ingredient in welfare, observers are likely to make
serious blunders, simply because in life, people do not usually focus on any particular
aspect or any particular ingredient. As we shall soon see, many of the puzzles in the
social science literature on subjective well-being are best explained in this light.
Consider a simple demonstration of a focusing illusion. Many people appear to
believe that they are less happy than that would be if they lived in California.65 This
belief is held both by people who live in California and people who do not live in
California. But in fact, those who live in California are not happier than those who live
elsewhere. Focusing on California weather in particular, Californians and Ohioans
believe that they would be happier in California even though weather is not, in fact, an
important determinant of most people’s happiness. Failures in affective forecasting are
often a product of a focusing illusion: People focus on a particular loss, without seeing
that after the loss has occurred, they are not likely to focus (much) on that loss.66 When
“primed” to think about weather, or any other factor that is a small ingredient in the
subjective well-being of most people (such as, for example, the ability to perform well in
sports), focusing illusions lead people to give excessive attention to that factor.
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Contingent valuation studies run into an exceedingly serious problem for this
reason.67 In such studies, people are specifically asked to value some good, event, or state
of affairs (including modest improvements in climate). If the focusing illusion is at work,
the resulting numbers will be unrealistically high. We could easily imagine such a study
with respect to the loss of two toes, an arm, or a leg. If nothing in life matters quite as
people think it does when they are thinking about it, then contingent valuation studies are
likely to inflate the importance of certain goods, because they are explicitly designed to
make people think about (the relevant) “it.” It should be easy to see that a similar
problem might infect judges and juries, which are, by hypothesis, being focused on a
particular loss.
These points, and an understanding of attention in particular, help to explain why
some conditions do in fact produce serious or enduring losses. Noise is the exemplar
here; loud and unpleasant noises create such losses because it is hard not to focus on
them. In the same vein, conditions that impose enduring losses command attention;
people necessarily focus on them. It is hard, for example, not to attend to chronic pain.
By definition, depression and anxiety cannot be put to one side. To the extent that social
situations draw constant attention to a condition, people will attend to that condition.
When people are separated from their spouses, they are focused, much of the time, on
that fact. A few years afterwards, divorce becomes a background fact, not a source of
constant attention. Parents whose children are suffering or needing constant attention,
will experience serious hedonic losses; it is hard not to attend to the needs or distress of
one’s children, and such distress can serve, for parents, as exceedingly loud noise (with
remarkable amplifiers).
Other puzzles in the hedonic literature can be similarly understood. Marriage
produces a short-term burst in life satisfaction, because those who are recently married
are thinking, much of the time, about their recent marriage. But after a few years,
marriage becomes part of life’s furniture, and it ceases to create the hedonic boost—even
if the union is entirely happy.
We can now understand one of the most counterintuitive findings in the hedonic
literature. The life satisfaction of many disabled people is not greatly lower than that of
67
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able-bodied people, and for some kinds of disabilities, life satisfaction is essentially the
same. At the same time, many disabled people believe that they were happier before they
were disabled, and there is clear evidence that they would pay a great deal to return to
their pre-disability state.68 If the analysis here is correct, disabled people are themselves
subject, or made subject, to a focusing illusion, when they are asked how their lives were
(would be) different when they were (if they were) not disabled, or how much they would
pay not to be disabled in terms of money or remaining years of life.69 I am not sure that
this claim is correct; we do not have sufficient evidence to know for sure. But if the claim
seems preposterous, consider the following question: “Would you be happier if the
weather in your city—say, Chicago, Boston, New York, or Philadelphia—were
automatically converted to the weather of Los Angeles or San Francisco?” You might
well say yes. But you would be wrong.
IV. Legal Implications
A. Juries, Adaptation, and Attention
For the legal system, there is a concrete implication. Juries and others are likely to
make hedonic judgment errors, often exaggerating the hedonic effects of losses.70 The
basic problem is that when asked to award damages for a certain loss, the attention of the
jury (and the judge) is fixated on the loss in question. It is as if juries were asked: Would
you be happier in California? Deliberately focused on a particular injury, juries are
unlikely to see that most of the time, the plaintiff may not be much focused on the
particular injury. The very circumstances of trial create the focusing illusion.71 In the
legal system, juries and judges are asked specifically to think about the importance of the
things that they are intensely thinking about.
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Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff has lost two fingers or an arm, and the jury
is asked to monetize the loss, including the pain and suffering associated with it. Because
of the power of the psychological immune system, it is not implausible to think that the
loss is short-term and very small. After a period of adjustment and (admittedly nontrivial)
transition costs, those who lose two fingers, or even an arm, may be only modestly worse
off, in hedonic terms, than those who have suffered no such loss. In fact they might not
be worse off at all; recall that there is no discernible hedonic difference between ordinary
people and those who have lost a limb as a result of cancer.72
Juries and judges are unlikely to understand this point. In all probability, they too
will suffer from a focusing illusion, akin to those asked whether they would be happier if
they lived in California. It is a sensible to think that in the award of damages, the legal
system is likely to be showing a systematic bias as a result. And in fact, it is not difficult
to find cases in which such a bias is exhibited, with substantial damage awards for
adverse events that are unlikely to have inflicted serious hedonic losses.73 Consider, for
example, a $1 million award for the loss of feeling and strength in a hand,74 or an award
of $1.5 million for the amputation of a finger.75
We might reach a similar conclusion for hedonic damages. If someone has lost a
dog, he is likely to suffer and the legal system should aware compensation. But the
suffering will not usually last a long time.76 Or suppose that someone has lost mobility,
so that she can no longer ski or play tennis. If the question is how much that person has
lost in terms of “enjoyment of life,” understood in hedonic terms, the answer is very
plausibly: Little or nothing.
It is both true and important that even if long-term harms are not likely, the shortterm harms might be severe. People might experience a degree of distress, fear,
mourning, and grief for which a significant degree of compensation is justified. The only
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point is that juries are likely to exaggerate the long-term effects and to that extent to
award excessive damage awards. If short-harm harms are severe, they should be
recognized and compensated as such.
The existence of hedonic forecasting errors also suggests the possibility that juries
are awarding insufficiently large sums in cases in which the hedonic loss is likely to be
high. Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff is suffering chronic back pain. The pain may
be relatively low-level, but it might be persistent. It is not difficult to find cases in which
juries award low damage awards in such instances.77 Consider, for example, a $4000
award for an accident producing headaches three to four times per week and persistent
pain in hands, knees, and shoulders78; a $25,000 award to nineteen-year-old woman
whose accident causes a painful hip deformity, headaches, ringing in ears, permanent
arthritis in hip, and backaches79; an award of $47,000 for accident causing herniation in
the lower back, accompanied by permanent radiating pain and restriction80; or an award
of $30,000 for permanent pain in the neck and knee from herniated cervical disc and torn
meniscus.81 In all these cases, the award seems far too low, because the relevant injury
was likely to be enduring.
In the abstract, low-level back pain, headaches, ringing in the ears, and pain in the
neck and knee may not seem especially serious; these are familiar phenomena, unlike loss
of a limb. But to the extent that such conditions are severe, they are likely to operate in
the same way as noise: as problem that do not much improve over time. People might
well undervalue such injuries with the thought that back pain, headaches, and ringing in
the ears are ordinary parts of human experience—unlike, say, the loss of toes. But those
who face chronic pain, severe headaches, or loud ringing in the ears suffer massive
hedonic losses, and jurors are unlikely to appreciate that fact.
It is possible of course that some juries and judges might distrust claims of back
pain, and to be discounting the award because of the risk of faking. But even if those
involved in the legal system do believe the claims, they will probably underestimate the
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adverse effects of certain losses over time. Imagine, for example, what it means to be
subject to loud ringing in the ears or to persistent headaches. The same points apply to
cases in which tortuous behavior produces depression or anxiety. In such cases, the
hedonic injury is very serious, and significant damage awards are justified.82 Juries and
judges might well fail to see this point.
B. Capability Damages
If the discussion thus far is correct, awards for pain and suffering, and for hedonic
damages, are often inflated from the hedonic point of view. But does this mean that they
are inflated from the correct point of view? The very ideas of “pain and suffering” and
“hedonic damages” suggest attention to subjective mental states. But it is possible that
subjective mental states are not all that matter, and that the legal system is attentive to
that fact. Let us now shift gears, moving from a purely Benthamite perspective, focused
only on subjective mental states, to an Aristotelian one, focused on what people are able
to do and to be.
Loss of capabilities. Suppose that Jones loses the use of a leg; suppose too that the
loss does not affect that Jones’ self-reported happiness. After a difficult but short period
of adjustment, Jones is as happy as he was before the loss. Suppose too that the effort to
measure Jones’ moment-by-moment happiness finds that he is no less happy than he was
before.83 In other words, Jones has experienced no hedonic loss. Should the legal system
therefore disregard Jones’ injury?
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What Jones has lost is a capability.84 He cannot walk on his leg; he certainly is
unable to run. He is unable to engage in many activities that he used to be able to take for
granted. Jones may not be in pain and he may not be suffering. Jones may not be
suffering hedonic damage in the sense that no hedometer can show that Jones enjoys his
life less than he did before. Might the legal system nonetheless award damages? If the
answer is yes, it is not justified by a hedonic loss. Instead the loss involves a capability.
That loss may be real and significant, even if hedonic measures are unable to capture it.
Consider, as apparently supporting evidence, the fact that most people would be willing
to pay significant amounts to avoid a loss of a capability, even if they could be persuaded
that the loss would inflict no hedonic harm.85
The claim on behalf of capability losses is a normative one, based on the objective
harm faced by those who lose physical or cognitive abilities. If people have had
colostomies or if they are on dialysis machines, they have suffered a significant loss
whatever their hedonic state. Consider here two remarkable findings. As we have seen,
people with colostomies do not show less happiness than people without colostomies; but
at the same time, they say that they would give up to 15% of their lives to be able to live
without a colostomy.86 Similarly, dialysis patients show little adverse hedonic effect, but
many of them say that they would willingly yield over half their remaining years in order
to have normal kidney function87! These answers seem to suggest a concern for
capabilities, not merely for hedonic states.
2. Hedonic judgment errors or recognition of capabilities? In invoking this
evidence, I do not mean to suggest that people’s statements on such points should be
84
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taken as authoritative.88 Begin with the case of healthy people. If such people are
horrified at the prospect of having a colostomy, and if they cannot bear the thought of
being on a dialysis machine, they might well believe, quite falsely, that the relevant
change would make life barely livable. Hedonic judgment errors of this kind might well
be impervious to debiasing. It is imaginable, for example, that people would be willing to
demand a great deal to lose a leg, even if they could be given a fully adequate prosthetic
(perhaps better than the original) and even if they could be given reliable evidence that
they would suffer no hedonic loss after a (brief) period of transition. People’s conclusions
about what they would pay to avoid or to eliminate a loss might well reflect a hedonic
judgment error, or a heuristic that is productive of blunders, and if so those conclusions
should not be taken as a basis for policy. If a hedonic judgment error is at work, people
are not, in fact, showing an appreciation of capability losses.
The judgments of those who have actually suffered such losses would seem to be
entitled to more weight. Because colostomy or dialysis patients would give up significant
amounts of their lives to be well, we do appear to have reason to think that they are
(recognizing that they are) suffering a real loss whatever their hedonic states. Compare a
person who has lost cognitive capacities; such a person may believe that they have
suffered a real loss even if their hedonic state is good. But it is possible that colostomy or
dialysis patients too are vulnerable to focusing illusions, no less than those in Chicago or
Cleveland who might be willing to give up a great deal to have the weather enjoyed by
people in Los Angeles. Recall that colostomy patients report wildly and inaccurately high
levels of happiness before they had colostomies, and that people whose colostomies have
been reversed say that they were far less happy than they were in fact.89
In short, I am not claiming that when people say that they want to avoid
conditions that do not impose hedonic losses, they are actually motivated by a recognition
of capability losses; a hedonic judgment error may well be responsible.90 My only claim
is that when people have lost a capability, they have lost something significant from the
normative point of view, even if they have suffered no hedonic loss.
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3. Law and well-being. For those who believe that the legal system should accept
this view, two difficult questions remain. First: What kinds of capability losses are
legally cognizable? Second: How can capabilities be translated into monetary
equivalents? At first glance, a notion of normal human functioning would seem to
provide the baseline from which to measure capability loss.91 It would follow that if
someone has lost the use of a leg or an arm, or of cognitive or sexual abilities, a
capability loss is involved. I will return below to the question of monetization.
Recognition of the importance of capabilities has broader importance for thinking
about well-being, whether it is measured in terms of self-reports involving global life
satisfaction92 or in terms of moment-by-moment measures, designed to capture daily
experience.93 Those who are able to run, or to have sexual experiences, are better off than
those who lack these capabilities, even if the difference cannot be measured in hedonic
terms. Those who are poorly educated have less in the way of capability than those who
are well educated, even if hedonic measures cannot pick up a difference between the two
groups. It is possible that people with less education do not show more negative affect or
less positive affect, during their days, than people with a great deal of education,94 but
education as such contributes to a richer life. Even if well-educated people do not seem
happier according to a hedometer, their enjoyments are more numerous and qualitatively
distinct; for good Millian reasons, taken up below, education is valuable whatever its
effects on utility, narrowly conceived.
An emphasis on subjective measures is important, because subjective experience
matters a great deal. But purely hedonic accounts, focused solely on people’s moods,
miss aspects of well-being to which sensible societies and legal systems are attuned. It is
easy to imagine a group of people who score well on some hedonic measure—perhaps
they are all generally at “6,” on a scale of 0-8, in terms of positive affect during their
days—whose lives are not very good, even in terms of their own considered judgments.
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In a variety of cases, supposedly hedonic damages are probably best justified as
capability damages. For example, courts have awarded hedonic damages for loss of the
ability to engage in sports.95 Hedonic damages have been awarded for the loss of the
senses of taste and smell.96 Courts have also awarded significant hedonic damages for
the loss of a limb, in a way that may reflect a capability loss rather than a hedonic
forecasting error.97 Hedonic damages have been awarded where the tort victim could no
longer engage in sexual activities as a result of the injury.98 Or consider a case in which
the injury rendered the plaintiff mentally retarded; the court awarded hedonic damages
for the plaintiff’s loss of ability to, among other things, go on a first date, parent children,
read, and debate the politics of the day.99 It is possible that the court believed that the
plaintiff was less happy in some subjective sense. If so, the court might well have been
wrong. But the plaintiff lost a capability, indeed a set of capabilities, and might be taken
to have deserved damages for that reason.
Consider the possibility that many people who have suffered significant
neurological damage are not less happy than they were before; there is no reason to
believe that people with Down’s Syndrome are unhappy and they may in fact be
unusually happy. Does it follow that damage awards should be low, or zero, for tortuous
behavior that has produced certain neurological damage, or Down’s Syndrome in infants?
If loss of capabilities matter, significant damage awards would be justified even without
an effect on subjective well-being.
4. Normative issues. The idea of capability damages will be puzzling to those with
strongly Benthamite inclinations, who think that such well-being is all that matters. And
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it is true that the term “hedonic damages” has an unmistakably Benthamite ring; if it is
using a nonhedonic measure, the legal system is relying on a theory of harm that is not
captured by the law’s own rubric. My principal suggestion is that many cases that award
such damages are best justified on the ground that they reflect an implicit commitment to
the importance of capabilities.100 People receive monetary compensation not because they
enjoy their lives less, but because they have lost a capability. A key question, which a
reading of the cases cannot answer, is whether the decisions are animated by some kind
of hedonic judgment error or instead an intuitive but sensible judgment about capabilities.
The normative issues are complex and I can offer only a few brief remarks here.
Suppose that Jones has been severely injured and suffers a serious loss in cognitive
capacities. Suppose too that the pain and suffering have been modest and that there is
little or no loss in subjective well-being. Should Jones receive capability damages? Under
the official theory of hedonic damages, the question is whether Jones has suffered a
diminution in his “enjoyment of life.” If that idea is understood is purely hedonic terms,
there is a real doubt whether damages should available; perhaps the relevant hedometers
are unable to pick up any loss. But it is plausible to think that Jones has lost some
“enjoyment of life” whatever the (relevant) hedometers say. Jones is now unable to have
certain kinds of enjoyments that are available only to those who operate at particular
cognitive level. The loss of (the capacity for) those enjoyments ought to matter.
For some of the cases, John Stuart Mill’s distinction between higher and lower
pleasures is clearly relevant.101 Thus Mill writes, “it is an unquestionable fact that those
who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both,
do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher
faculties. . . . [No] intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed
person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and
base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better
satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.”102 When hedonic damages are awarded
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for the loss of cognitive capacities, judges and juries might well be responding to a logic
of this kind.
If it is correct to emphasize the importance of capabilities, the general argument
applies to a wide range of losses, including those that do not involve higher-level
cognitive functions. If Jones is unable to engage in sexual relationships, or to participate
in certain athletic activities, it is plausible to say that his “enjoyment of life” has been
impaired, once the right content has been given to that concept. It is true, however, that
use of the idea of capability makes less sense for those losses that are essentially hedonic.
If a person was once able to play tennis, but no longer can, is there a genuine loss if no
hedometer can identify it? The answer to that question may be “no” even if we are
confident that those with serious cognitive impairments, however happy, have lost some
of the enjoyment of life. Perhaps the answer is “yes,” because the person has lost an
option, and because the option has value. I will return to this issue shortly.
C. Translating (Hedonic and Capability) Losses into Money
Suppose that Jones has suffered a loss of a leg and that the loss produces a stated
hedonic injury. We might agree that the loss is less serious than the loss of both legs, but
more serious than the loss of three toes. What is the monetary value of the loss? Perhaps
the same method can be used to answer that question regardless of whether we are
investigating hedonic losses or capability losses.
1. Willingness to pay? If we were speaking in economic terms, we might ask how
much Jones would be willing to pay to eliminate a 1/100,000 risk of losing the loss of a
leg. As we have seen, this is a standard approach in the valuation of mortality and
morbidity risks. Suppose that the focus is on Jones’ hedonic loss. If so, the discussion
thus far should be enough to show that Jones’ willingness to pay may reflect a hedonic
forecasting error. Perhaps Jones would be willing to pay $50 to avoid that risk, implying
a loss of $5 million, even though the hedonic loss from a lost leg would not be terribly
serious. Recall that loss aversion itself appears to be a hedonic forecasting error.103
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Alternatively, suppose that the focus is on Jones’ capability loss. Perhaps Jones is
concerned that the loss of a leg is a loss of a capability. He might want to pay a certain
amount to preserve the “option value” of having his leg; or he might want to pay that
amount of preserve the capability as such. In principle, his willingness to pay might be a
good measure of the relevant value. But it is hard to imagine that faced with small
probabilities of such losses, people can generate figures that reliably capture the
capability values of significant harms, especially in view of the difficulty of measuring
the actual effects of such losses before they have occurred.
If the goal of compensation is to restore people to the status quo, then people’s
willingness to pay, before the fact, is an unreliable measure. In fact it may be a mistake to
rely on people’s judgment about necessary compensation even after they are injured. Of
course their judgment is least reliable in the period immediately following the injury. At
that point, their focus on the injury and its removal may reflect a focusing illusion, no less
than when people are asked about the weather. And long after the injury has occurred, a
focusing illusion might also distort their judgments, whether we are speaking in hedonic
terms or in terms of capabilities. Recall that colostomy and dialysis patients would pay a
great deal (in terms of remaining years of life!) to be well, even though available
measures suggest that they are no less happy than they were before.
2. Scaling without a modulus. Loosened from willingness to pay, however, jurors
are likely to produce highly unpredictable results. Indeed, the problem of translating
hedonic or capability harms into monetary equivalents is a large source of inequality and
variability in the legal system. Studies of pain and suffering awards show a great deal of
“noise,” in the form of variations unexplained by differences in the cases.104 The same is
true of awards for sexual harassment.105 Experimental work suggests that some of the
unpredictability comes from the fact that when translating injuries into dollars, jurors are
being asked to “scale without a modulus”—that is, to assign monetary values along an
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unbounded numerical scale without being given a modulus, or standard, by which to
establish a meaning for the various points on the scale.106
Imagine, for example, that people are asked to offer a numerical equivalent for the
brightness of a light, or the loudness of a noise, on a bounded scale of 0 to infinity. There
is every reason to believe that their judgments would have a high degree of
unpredictability—not because of disagreement on anything substantial, but because of the
nature of the scale. This problem certainly infects awards for pain and suffering: What is
the monetary equivalent of three months with migraine headaches, or six months of
rehabilitation of a broken leg, or back pain for the next twenty years? The same is true for
hedonic damages, for jurors are not giving a modulus by which to decide on the
economic value of some loss of the enjoyment of life. What is the monetary equivalent
of the loss of a dog, a limb, cognitive functioning, or sexual capacities?
The translation of hedonic or capability losses into monetary equivalents raises
daunting problems. But at the very least, it would be valuable to be able to know what is
lost in welfare terms, before any attempt is made at translation. My minimal suggestion
here has been that judges and juries are likely to make serious blunders in answering the
welfare question.
D. Toward Civil Damages Guidelines
We can now identify two serious problems in the current situation. First (and this
is the more established problem), juries and judges are likely to have difficulty in
generating monetary figures to reflect pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life.
Second (and this is the problem uncovered by the happiness literature), juries and judges
are likely to make hedonic judgment errors. My emphasis has been on the second
problem, but if we take the two together, we will be inclined to consider large-scale
reforms. Proceeding from scratch, no sensible person could possibly want to produce
damage awards by asking ordinary people, with little guidance, to assign monetary
amounts to losses with which they are unlikely to have had much experience.
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The most obvious response would be a set of Civil Damages Guidelines, charged
with the task of rationalizing the current situation. The guidelines would place heavy
reliance on existing knowledge about hedonic harms, so as to avoid the risk of high
awards for illusory losses and low awards for such harms as chronic pain, migraines,
anxiety, and depression. To the extent that the short-term hedonic losses are present even
when long-term adaptation occurs, the guidelines would take that point into account. To
the extent that discrimination and stigma play a role in producing hedonic or other harm,
the guidelines would consider that point as well.107 A significant part of the harm of
certain injuries consists of the resulting social stigma, on which it might be difficult not
to focus and from which both economic and noneconomic injuries may follow. Those
injuries deserve to count.108 Moreover, a large advantage of the guidelines is that they
would make it less necessary, and perhaps even unnecessary, for disabled plantiffs to
“perform” their disability or their suffering in court, in a way that could be embarrassing
and even humiliating.
The guidelines would also attempt to make sensible translations into monetary
equivalents, perhaps by drawing workers’ compensation awards, which reflect a similar
attempt at rationalization. WTP figures would provide at least a start here; perhaps the
best approach would begin with WTP for hedonic and capability losses and make
suitable adjustments when WTP depends on a demonstrable error. Finally, the guidelines
would make judgments about capability damages, clearly distinguishing them from
hedonic harms.
The development of such guidelines would have a significant technocratic
dimension. The goal would not be to build on ordinary intuitions, which are unreliable. It
would instead be to incorporate what has been learned about the actual effects of various
losses. To the extent that the legal system is concerned with the consequences for
subjective well-being, the distinction between persistent and illusory losses would play a
key role. A great deal of attention would have to be paid to ranking capability losses and
turning them into monetary equivalents. If such guidelines were in place, the role of
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judges and juries would be limited and analogous to that of judges under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.
E. Broader Lessons
These remarks bear on much larger questions. In this section, I offer some notes
on the relationship between happiness on the one hand and willingness to pay and income
growth on the other.
1. Willingness to pay and happiness. As I have suggested, many economists and
economically oriented lawyers work with the WTP criterion. If people are willing to pay
$50 to eliminate a 1/100,000 risk of losing a foot, there is a good argument that
government should start with that number in deciding on appropriate policies. Suppose,
however, that people’s WTP is a product of a systematic bias, perhaps in the form of a
focusing illusion. If so, the connection between WTP and welfare effects will be
weakened and possibly very weak. And if this is so, there are serious problems with
reliance on WTP, because it operates as a crude proxy for welfare effects. In short,
hedonic forecasting errors raise serious problems for standard ways of conducting costbenefit analysis.
We can see the point most clearly in connection with contingent valuation studies.
Suppose that people are asked: How much would you be willing to pay to ensure that
climate in your city does not increase by a certain amount by a certain date, or to avoid a
1/100,000 chance of losing a finger? The problem is that such questions specifically
focus people on a certain loss and for that reason create a grave risk of a focusing
illusion.109 To the extent that contingent valuation studies elicit WTP, there is a serious
problem.
Perhaps markets will reduce the problem, because the budget constraint, and the
full menu of possible expenditures, looms much larger in the market domain than in the
circumstances of surveys. Perhaps in their daily lives, people will not suffer serious
focusing illusions when deciding how much to pay to reduce risks, because they are alert,
at the relevant times, to the opportunity costs of the expenditures. Nonetheless, sellers of
products would very much like to generate focusing illusions in order to ensure that
109
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people will buy their products. And it is entirely possible that even in the market domain,
WTP reflects a systematic distortion with respect to losses that seem to be significant (but
are not) and with respect to losses that seem to be relatively trivial (but are large). A great
deal of work remains to be done on this problem, which seems to unsettle many of the
standard claims and views in economic analysis of policy and law.110
2. Income growth, happiness, and capability. One of the most striking findings in
modern social science is that increases in economic growth are not correlated with
increases in measures of happiness or reported life-satisfaction.111 The United States,
France, and Japan all experienced dramatic increases in real income in the 20th century,
but showed no increase in subjective well-being.112 An especially striking finding
involves China.113 Between 1994 and 2005, China experienced explosive growth in
average real income—250 percent in fact. In that same period, life satisfaction has
actually declined, with a reduction in reported “satisfaction” from 80 percent to 70
percent, and an increase in reported “dissatisfaction” from 21 percent to 35 percent.114
For purposes of self-reported happiness according to global measures, what
appears to matter is relative economic position, not absolute economic position.115
People’s self-reported happiness, by global measures, is greatly affected by their position
in the economic hierarchy rather than by their absolute wealth. Apparently those who are
in a high position, in a relevant hierarchy, impose “positional externalities” on others,
causing hedonic damage.116 By contrast, significant shifts in absolute economic position
produce little or no hedonic change. From existing evidence, it is odd but not implausible
to say that if GDP of America or France doubled in some period of years, we would not
pick up any increase in people’s life-satisfaction. (Return to the case of China.) This
conclusion seems counterintuitive but on reflection may not be: Do we really believe that
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people now living are much happier than people who lived (say) five decades earlier, and
that those who lived five decades earlier were happier than those who preceded them?
Even when GDP grows every decade, does subjective well-being grow correspondingly?
The problem, for those who believe that subjective well-being is our lodestar, is that
existing evidence suggests that economic growth is not a good way to increase national
well-being.
Some people believe that what matters is not global measures of happiness, but
measures of moment-by-moment happiness. Perhaps global measures are a crude way of
capturing what really matters, which is happiness as it is actually experienced.117 But
even if this is so, absolute income is a poor measure of moment-by-moment happiness;
across a certain threshold, there is no evidence that wealth is correlated with positive
affect or with an absence of negative affect.118 Even relative economic position, though
correlated with global measures, is not correlated with measure of moment-by-moment
happiness.119 We might therefore conclude that whether global or moment-by-moment
measures are the appropriate guide, economic growth does not much matter to people’s
welfare.
But there is an important qualification. From the discussion thus far, it should be
clear that self-reported happiness is not the only thing that is important, even if welfare,
properly understood, is our lodestar. Happiness may not increase with growth in GDP,
but one result of GDP growth may well be increases in longevity, health, and
opportunity.120 From the standpoint of increasing human welfare, it is good to enable
people to live eighty healthy years than forty less healthy years, even if their level of
daily happiness does not increase. If increases in GDP are correlated with longer and
healthier lives, and with better opportunities and greater education, such increases appear
to promote welfare even if subjective happiness stays constant. Recall here the view that
capabilities have independent importance. To the extent that increases in GDP increase
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literacy, promote health, and ensure greater opportunity, they are valuable whatever
happens to subjective happiness.
This point receives indirect support from some intriguing differences between
measures of global life satisfaction and measures of moment-by-moment happiness.
Remarkably, it turns out that the two are only weakly correlated.121 For example, global
life satisfaction is positively affected by whether one is married, has children, or is
wealthy—but moment-by-moment happiness is not. (In fact divorced women report both
lower life-satisfaction and higher moment-by-moment happiness than married
women.122) It is tempting to think that the moment-by-moment measures are more
accurate, because they are more reliable than global measures, which seem to be a stab in
the dark. Consider the fact that experimenters can easily “prime” those who answer
general questions about “happiness” or “life satisfaction,” for example by asking them
first how many dates they have had in the past month.123 Such questions significantly
affect reported life-satisfaction. Perhaps those who are not specifically primed engage in
a kind of self-priming, asking certain questions (am I married, do I have children, or am I
wealthy?) in a way that produces inaccurate measures of how happy they are in fact. On
this view, moment-by-moment measures are far better; if people are saddened by asking
questions about their global life-satisfaction, their sadness should matter only to the
extent that it shows up in their actual experience.
On a different view, however, global measures produce not inaccurate proxies,
but more reflective judgments, in which people assess how well their lives are actually
going. It is easy to imagine somewhat negative answers to that question despite high
levels of moment-by-moment happiness, produced by hedonically good lives in which
people see friends a great deal, have long vacations, and greatly enjoy their days. Such
people might nonetheless conclude that their lives are not particularly satisfying, perhaps
because they lack depth or meaning. Similarly, it is easy to imagine highly positive
reactions to global life-satisfaction questions despite not-high levels of moment-bymoment happiness. The high levels of life satisfaction and the not-high levels of moment-
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by-moment happiness might be produced by lives in which people work hard, serve
others, and have a great deal of stress.
I am not insisting that in fact, most people are giving reflective answers to
questions about global life satisfaction, offering a mixture of judgments about their
moods, their capabilities, and their assignments of meaning. What is clear is that even if
social gains along various dimensions do not register either on global or moment-bymoment measures, they should nonetheless count as gains; consider a population that is
better educated, significantly healthier, and given more options about what to do with
their lives. If economic growth produces those gains, it is valuable even if it does not
have significant hedonic effects.
But if the goal really is welfare, we might pursue the relevant ends directly, and
focus on economic growth only to the extent that it is responsible or a good proxy for the
relevant improvements. If the evidence on subjective happiness is taken seriously, the
consequences for law and policy would appear to be significant, because economic
growth would be demoted to a secondary matter, to be promoted only to the extent that it
helps achieve primary goals, which might in any case be pursued directly.124
Conclusion
In many contexts, the legal system requires people to make difficult hedonic
judgments. If people make serious hedonic judgment errors in their own lives, it is highly
likely that juries and judges will make equivalent errors. In particular, there is a serious
risk that adjudicative institutions will significantly overestimate the hedonic losses
associated with certain injuries. The exaggerations stem in part from a failure to
appreciate people’s powers of adaptation; they also stem, more specifically, from the kind
of focusing illusion that people demonstrate when thinking about the effects of weather.
Often apparently significant losses turn out to be illusory, at least if they are understood
in hedonic terms.
There are two particular implications. The first is that those involved in awarding
damages must clearly distinguish between those injuries that involve persistent harm and
those injuries that do not. Some injuries fall within the same category as unpleasant
124
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noises, on which people cannot help but focus; other injuries, such as the loss of toes,
inflict little hedonic harm. The second implication is that “capability damages” deserve
independent analysis. Even if little or no hedonic loss is suffered, it is reasonable to
conclude that people deserve to be compensated in the event of a loss or serious injury to
capabilities.
I have suggested that the legal system now suffers from serious problems in
making hedonic judgments and in translating hedonic and capability losses into monetary
equivalents. The natural response is a set of Civil Damages Guidelines, incorporating
sensible assessments of monetization, the best available information about hedonic
effects, and reflective judgments about capability losses.
It should be clear that these points have implications for how policymakers might
think about a range of questions outside of the domain of adjudication. These include the
limits of the willingness to pay criterion, the value of national income growth, and
appropriate priority-setting for governments concerned to improve social well-being. The
minimal conclusion is that if hedonic states matter, governments should give far higher
priority than they now do to the relief of mental illness and chronic pain.125 More
generally, it would not be surprising if governments make significant hedonic judgment
errors in fiscal and regulatory policy. If so, efforts to correct the resulting errors would
produce major welfare gains.
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